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An official Russian government document on reforming the Kremlin administration was 
leaked to a newspaper in Moscow. The three principal authors recommended that 
Russia become an even stronger presidential republic and urged that "the most 
effective methods be applied toward achieving this objective."2
President Putin's chief of staff, Aleksandr S. Voloshin; the Center for Strategic Studies 
director, German O. Gref; and the Federal Security Service (FSB) chief, Nikolai P. 
Patrushev, all had come to the same conclusion: Democratic institutions should not be 
nurtured, and a return to force must be initiated. Preparations for adopting such a 
course of action seem to be underway.
The presidential administration is only mentioned in the Russian constitution, which 
provides it with no executive authority. The above-cited document, however, 
recommends that
"the administration of the president should become an organ capable of deciding 
important government and political tasks within the country as well as abroad [and] 
exert its influence upon all state and non-state organs for the purpose of implementing 
decisions of the president."
Furthermore, "this program suggests a strategic imperative toward strengthening 
political activity of the presidential administration at the center and in the regions."
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The council of ministers would be restricted to deciding economic tasks, without 
deviating from the line taken by the political administration in the Kremlin. The president, 
thus, would embody the center of power and assume complete control over all political 
processes in Russia.
Establishment of the new order is justified as follows: "[Current] Sociopolitical conditions 
in Russia can be described as self-regulating." If the president wants to maintain order 
and stability, a new administrative structure is required that "not only will create the 
necessary political conditions inside the country but also throughout the Near 
Abroad" (i.e., among the currently independent states that formerly had been part of the 
USSR).
The document openly states that "this program is supported by the strategic necessity 
to integrate the FSB and other special services with activities of the president's political 
administration." It further asserts that "the intellectual, cadres', and professional 
potential at FSB disposal should be assimilated by the new political administration in 
order to achieve rapid, articulate, and productive results."
Clandestine methods will be used to influence and/or suppress political parties and 
movements, their leaders, regional administrators and legislatures, candidates for 
important political posts, and activities of electoral commissions. Basic objectives 
include building support for the president and discrediting the opposition.
Furthermore, this document offers itself as a manual for counter-propaganda, with 
questions and answers provided. Under the category of "preventive political action," for 
example, the following situation is described: An opposition activist intends to address a 
press conference about corruption in government. The Kremlin preempts this by 
releasing materials that discredit the would-be whistleblower.
All of the above is significant, because the number of former KGB officers within 
Russian central authorities has already passed the point of achieving a "critical mass." 
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The open merger of special services with the presidential administration reminds one of 
the unforgettable past. The FSB is being transformed, thus, into a branch of presidential 
protective services. It now defends the president and his power, not society.
The above-cited document specifically proposes collection of "special information on 
potential candidates for the office of president at the current time and also in the 
future."3
Legislative implementation of the plan to concentrate state power in the Kremlin was 
launched on 1 June 2000, when the Duma passed the first reading of Putin's three 
proposed laws by a vote of 362 to 34. The other two readings occurred that same week. 
This legislation had been preceded by the establishment (decree of 17 May 2000) of 
seven federal administrative districts, each governor having been appointed by and 
remaining responsible directly to the president. (See Table 1.)
In order to implement the above proposal, it has been recommended4 that a merger 
take place that would encompass five special services, which would become a single 
Federal Security Department. They are the following:5
1. Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR -Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki), responsible for 
espionage outside Russia and reporting directly to President Putin. Cooperative 
agreements exist with all former Soviet republics except Azerbaijan, Georgia and the 
three Baltic states.
2. Federal Security Service (FSB - Federal'naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) includes 
counter-intelligence activities as well as suppression of crime and illegal groups 
attempting to overthrow the constitutional system.
3. Federal Protective Service (FSO - Federal'naya Sluzhba Okhrany) is the Kremlin's 
praetorian guard, which protects the president and key government officials.
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4. Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI - 
Federal'noe Agentstvo Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi i Informatsii), the counterpart of the US 
National Security Agency. Its responsibilities include maintenance and security of 
encrypted government communications. Domestically, it attempts to control Russia's 
"information space."
5. Directorate for Combating Organized Crime6 in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD - 
Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del). Its interdepartmental anti-terrorist commission may be 
absorbed by the FSB Directorate for Analysis and Suppression of Activity by Criminal 
Organizations or by a successor entity. (See Table 2.)
This recommendation, if implemented, may suggest that Putin has lost confidence in the 
part of the MVD listed in (5) above, although he retains trust in the FSB.
Such faith in former KGB officers manifests itself in such appointments as that of Sergei 
B. Ivanov, a 20-year veteran in foreign intelligence (SVR) with the rank of lieutenant 
general, who became secretary of the Security Council on 15 November 1999.7 This 
man recently resigned his military rank and may become the first head of the new 
super-conglomerate comprising the five organizations listed above. Ivanov remains, as 
do all retired intelligence officers, in the "active reserve" of his former service. 
These currently separate organizations comprise a total of more than 200,000 
individuals. Such a combined "strike force" certainly requires a dynamic individual to 
make it work. 
Ivanov would seem to have impeccable credentials. Born in 1953, one year later than 
Putin, he also was graduated from Leningrad State University, although in philosophy 
rather than law. He speaks English and Swedish. After 20 years in the FSB, he became 
its deputy director in August 1998. Ivanov most probably has daily contact with Putin in 
his current position as secretary of the Security Council.
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By placing former KGB personnel in key positions throughout the central government 
apparatus in Moscow (e.g., former SVR director Vyacheslav I. Trubnikov, appointed 
deputy foreign minister, on 28 June 2000) as well as in several of the seven regions, the 
"eyes and ears" of the president will report on all opposition to his governmental fiat. 
Putin already has launched a program to stop leaks from the government. This new 
campaign will also include watching the Duma as well as the military's General Staff.8 
The reintroduction of political commissars (zampolit) is underway throughout the armed 
forces.
Nationwide surveillance is being implemented under the Information Security Doctrine 
approved by Putin last fall. It provides for government supervision over the mass media, 
including the Internet. The FSB is also charged with monitoring electronic mail as well 
as establishing controls over TV and websites.9
Such an emerging police state will have a negative impact throughout Russia, in that 
the "attentive public" will begin to draw parallels with the former communist tyranny. 
Indications of nostalgia for this recent past, however, were expressed by Putin himself 
when he drank a toast recently on the long-deceased Stalin's birthday. He also glorified 
his former KGB chief, Yuri V. Andropov (1967-1982), on the "Day of Security Organs," 
i.e., 20 December 1999, at Lubyanka headquarters. If these two men represent role 
models for Putin, the long-suffering Russian people may yet become subjected to an 
old-new form of communism.
The leader of the YABLOKO faction in parliament, Grigori A. Yavlinsky, addressed a 
congress in defense of human rights on 21 January 2001. He stated that the current 
pseudo-reforms in Russia reflect the rise of "national bolshevism" and called for making 
the secret services accountable to the law.10
When the statue of Feliks E. Dzherzhinsky once again stands on Lubyanka Square, the 
FSB and other special services will have attained open recognition as the legitimate 
successors to the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
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In the meanwhile, secret police commando forces will be proving their reliability by 
attempting to wind down the 16-month military campaign in Chechnya. The regular 
occupation army, being cut back from 93,000 to 22,000 men, will provide security for its 
own garrisons and surrounding areas, whereas FSB troops will organize "special 
operations" to exterminate the remaining "bandit" gangs and their leaders.11 
Will this work? Probably not, although Putin can always proclaim victory and still 
continue unpublicized attempts at complete genocide of the Chechen people.
 Table 1. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS
 Designation  Capital  Presidential 
Representative
 Central Moscow  Georgi S. 
Poltavchenko (career 
KGB; former 
presidential 
representative of the 
Leningrad oblast')
 Northwest St. Petersburg  Viktor V. Cherkesov 
(former first deputy 
director, FSB; 
lieutenant general)
 North Caucasus Rostov-on-Don  Viktor G. Kazantsev 
(former commanding 
officer, North 
Caucasus military 
district; colonel 
general)
 Volga Nizhnyi Novgorod  Sergei V. Kirienko 
(former prime 
minister)
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 Urals Ekaterinburg  Piotr M. Latyshev 
(former first deputy 
interior minister; 
lieutenant general)
 Siberia Novosibirsk  Leonid L. 
Drachevsky (former 
CIS affairs minister)
Far East Vladivostok  Konstantin B. 
Pulikovsky (acting 
commanding officer, 
mid-1996, in 
Chechnya war; 
lieutenant general)
 Source: Andrei Korbut and Dmitri Nikolaev, "Siloviki v 
regionakh," Novoe voennoe obozrenie, 19­25 May 2000, p. 1, 
which cites the 13 May presidential decree (ukaz), "O 
pelnomochnom predstavitele prezidenta RF v federal'nom 
okruge."
 Notes: These seven new administrative districts are identical 
with the seven current military districts. At the same time, Putin 
dismissed all presidential representatives to the 89 provinces. Of 
the seven individuals in the above table, five were either career 
military/police or KGB/FSB officers.
 Table 2. POWER STRUCTURES IN RUSSIA
 Designation  Strength
 Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
(MVD) Rushailo, 
Vladimir B
300,000
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 Ministry of Civil 
Defense (MChS)
Shoigu, Sergei K.
40,000
 Ministry of 
Defense (MO)
Sergeev, Igor D.
1,200,000
 Foreign 
Intelligence Service 
(SVR)
Lebedev, Sergei N.
15,000
 Federal Border 
Service (FPS)
Totsky, Konstantin 
V.
250,000
 *Federal Security 
Service (FSB)
Patrushev, Nikolai 
P.
80,000
 Federal Service of 
Railroad Troops 
(FSZhV)
Kogatko, Grigori I.
90,000
 Federal Service of 
Tax Police (FSNP)
Soltaganov, 
Vyacheslav F.
43,800
8
 Federal Protective 
Service (FSO)
Murov, Evgeny A.
40,000
 Federal Agency for 
Communications 
and Information 
(FAPSI)
Matyukhin, 
Vladimir G.
50,000
 TOTAL 2,108,800
 The agencies underlined would be amalgamated 
under the plan.
 Sources: Galina Kozhevnikova and Pavel Gazukin, 
Silovye struktury Rossii (Moscow: Panorama, 2000), 
pp. 8-48 of 2nd rev. edition; Andrei Maksimov, Kto 
pravit v rossiiskoi federatsii (Moscow: Izdaniya 
Maksimova, 2000/2001), pp. 34-142
 * The FSB Special Assignment Center includes 
Directorate A (former Alpha Group) and Directorate 
V (ex-Vympel Group), with regional departments for 
special services in eleven cities to combat terrorism 
and organized crime.
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